



Central Intelligence Agency Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence

22 December 1986

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Commander-in-Chief, USCINCPAC	
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Given the interest generated by South	
Korea's campaign against the large hydroelectric	
project North Korea is planning near the DMZ,	
I thought you might want to read the attached	
assessment.	25X1
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We	23/1
are working on a more detailed study of the	
project and will forward it to you early next	
year.	
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Richard J. Kerr	
Richard J. Kerr Deputy Director for Intelligence	
	
Deputy Director for Intelligence	25 X 1
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Central Intelligence Agency



DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE


12 December 1986 '

		The	Kumgangsar	n Dam Contro	versy		25 X 1
				Summary			
	to be	locate	ed about 10	P'yongyang' kilometers military th	from the DM2	n Dam Zposes	
	South		conomic and	military ch	reac to the		25 X 1
		'					25X1
					In o	our	25X1
				am project h	as a primar	ily	
	econor South		al and is n	ot intended	to threaten	the	25X1
				,			23/1
The	<u>Politi</u>	cal Ang	gle: Seoul	's Charges			
	P'yon	qyanq r	media annou	nced on 21 0	ctober that	groundbreaking	
cere	monies	had be	een held fo	r the massiv	e Kumgangsar	hydroelectric	
powe that	r stat large	lon, oi numbei	ne of the c rs of North	ountry's maj Korean sold	or economic iers were pa	projects, and articipating in	
the	constr	uction.	. Since th	en, Seouli	n a well-pla	anned media	
camp	aign	has cha	arged that	the dam woul	d threaten	the South's	
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This	memor	andum v	was prepa <mark>re</mark>				√ 25X1
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economy and security, cause shortages of agricultural, industrial, and drinking water, and considerably reduce the electric power generation capacity of five South Korean dams. The government also has claimed that a deliberate or accidental destruction of the dam would devastate the central part of the peninsula, inundate Seoul, and result in long-term destruction of the ecosystem. Part of the Antileftist Crackdown	25 X 1
In our view, the timing of Seoul's publicity of the dam highlights the South Koreans' political motives.	25 X 1 25 X 1
Seoul has known since at least 1984 that North Korea was planning to build a giant dam near the DMZ, but made no move to solicit US views on the issue or to map out a coordinated counterstrategy. Either move would be expected if there were genuine concern about a	
security threat.	25X1
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P'yongyang responded to Seoul's charges by imposing a news	
blackout on its Kumgangsan Dam activities and launching its own propaganda campaign. It claims that:	
The Kumgangsan project is only an effort to develop Kangwon Province's water resources, and that rather than adversely affecting the South, the dam will help prevent seasonal flood damage there.	

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	m will hold only 3.6 billion rather than the 20 n tons of water claimed by Seoul.	
bilate	resource exploitation should be settled rally, not by international mediation, which foster the "two Koreas" concept.	25
onomic Importa	nce to the North	
droelectric po nge goal to ex reaten the Sou	P'yongyang's plan to build the Kumgangsan wer plant in Kangwon Province is part of a long-pand electric power output rather than a means to th. Shortages of all forms of energy have long h and have had repercussions throughout the	25
<u> </u>		25
portant to Kan its electric	The Kumgangsan plant would be particularly gwon Province, long neglected in the development power base.	2! 2!
mping stations ver, which flo her rivers. Drion of the Pservoir that wll be carried m to provide pughly 15 to 25	the system will consist of several dams and that will draw water not only from the Pukhan ws into the South, but also from the Imjin and amming the lower reaches of the North Korean ukhan River will back the water up to form a ill cover much of Ch'angdo County. This water about 50 to 60 kilometers from the site of the ower for generating equipment to be installed kilometers south of the port city of Wonsan in	
e area of Sinh We believe nished, especi st if not all obably will ta t fill to capa wer plant is l rth Koreans, w 5,000-kilowatt	that it will be many years before the project is ally because the North apparently plans to do of the work itself. Completion of the dams ke at least seven years, but the reservoir will city for several years after that. Building this ikely to be a formidable undertaking for the ho have only recently begun to manufacture generators, the size to be installed in the new lectric plant and probably to be used in the	25 \ 25
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Impact o	the South's Economy	
from a re	pelieve the impact on the South Korean economy resulting educed flow of water caused by the Kumgangsan dam could ed by Seoul:	
	Agricultural production. Less than 3 percent of South Korea's total cultivated land is in the seven counties bordering the Pukhan and Han Rivers from the DMZ to Seoul, and only a fraction of that is directly dependent on waters from those rivers.	
	Hydroelectric power capacity. The five dams along the affected rivers generate only about 2 percent of South Korea's electricity; Seoul's ambitious nuclear power program will reduce hydropower's share.	
	Water for industrial use. The Kumgangsan dam will cut off less than 10 percent of the Han River watershed area, according to our estimates. Upstream, some local industries will encounter difficulties, particularly in the more heavily populated areas such as Hwach'on and Ch'unch'on.	
		25 X
	Implications	

We see little merit in Seoul's claims of a military motive behind North Korea's plans to build the Kumgangsan Dam. A breach of the dam would destroy some bridges, roads, and crossing points in the Han River valley and impair the mobility of South Korean forces. But these lines of communication are the same ones the North would need for an invasion. The long construction period for the dam would enable the South to relocate military units and facilities.

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